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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the court properly acted in making a finding 
that the plaintiff discovered, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered that he had sustained an injury 
and that the injury was caused by negligent action more than two 
years before he commenced an action against the health care 
providers named in this action• 
2. Whether plaintiff's affidavit and deposition and the 
other pleadings in this case present questions of fact that 
preclude the court from entering summary judgment against the 
plaintiff. 
3. Whether the case of Foil v. Ballinger is still law in 
Utah. 
4. Whether the special statute of limitations set forth in 
the Health Care Malpractice Act violates appellant's right to 
equal protection under the Utah State Constitution and the United 
States Constitution. 
5. Whether there is a conflict of law in Section 78-14-
4(1)(b) and Section 78-12-26(3) of the Utah Code. 
6. Whether there was sufficient purpose in the shortening 
of statute of limitations in the Health Care Malpractice Act to 
warrant special considerations to Health Care Providers. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County issued an Order on July 20, 
1987 granting summary judgment in favor of all the defendants 
based on the following finding: 
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, the plaintiff discovered 
or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered that he had sustained an injury and 
that the injury was caused by negligent action more 
than two years before he commenced an action against 
the health care providers; consequently, his claims of 
medical malpractice are barred by the statute of 
limitations prescribed in Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended). 
(R 186 and 187, Order) 
The court, without hearing any evidence, issued the above 
order. From that action, this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACT? 
This is a case of medical malpractice against Dr. Martin C. 
Lindem, St. Mark's Hospital, and Dr. Lynn L. Wilcox arising out 
of their negligence in performing stomach surgery on appellant 
Charles Floyd in December, 1981, and treatment that occurred 
thereafter to appellant, Charles Floyd. 
The appellant contends that there are disputed questions of 
fact which a trial court must resolve and that the granting of 
Summary Judgment by the Court in this action was improper. 
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Appellant claims that during the operation, without 
appellant's knowledge or consent, Dr. Lindem performed additional 
surgery and opened up the lower stomach (pyloroplasty) and cut 
the vagus nerves (truncal vagotomy). Thereafter, the appellant 
suffered from diarrhea and dumping syndrome which has made it 
almost impossible for appellant to work or otherwise live any 
type of normal life. 
In April, 1982, appellant, after quizzing Dr. Martin C. 
Lindem about the surgical procedures performed upon him, was 
informed by Dr. Martin C. Lindem that additional surgery had been 
performed upon him. However, appellant was informed that all 
surgical procedures performed were a necessary part of the hiatal 
hernia repair and were necessary to correct reflux esophagitis. 
At this time, appellant was further told by Dr. Lindem that the 
problems he was then experiencing would resolve within two to 
three years. (R. 171 - 174, also R 199, Floyd deposition pages 
97 and 98, 102) 
Appellant did not become aware that the December, 1981 
surgery to his lower stomach and the cutting of the vagus nerves 
were not necessary or a part of the hiatal hernia repair until 
mid 1985. (R. 171-174, R 199, Floyd deposition, page 102) 
Appellant is entitled to have the facts of this case 
construed most strongly in his favor and the facts of this case 
indicate that appellant did not become aware that the health care 
providers were negligent in their treatment and the surgery they 
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performed upon appellant until the mid part of 1985. Discovery 
of the defendants1 negligence was not made until appellant was 
told by another physician that the vagotomy and pyloroplasty were 
not necessary for the hiatal hernia repair and further that the 
conditions from which appellant suffered were probably permanent 
and would not improve. (R 171-174) 
Within five months of making this discovery, appellant 
obtained counsel, had the matter reviewed by a competent surgeon 
in Florida, and prepared his Notice of Intent to Commence 
Litigation on November 27, 1985 (still within the four-year 
statute) and served the same upon the defendant health care 
providers November 27, 1985. The Notice of Intent to Commence 
Litigation was in fact served within the four-year statutory 
period. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court should have at least held an evidentiary hearing, 
after discovery was completed, to ascertain when in fact the 
appellant discovered the alleged negligence or malpractice. The 
Court should have allowed the case to go to trial and heard 
evidence on all issues concerning discovery of the alleged 
negligence. The court committed error in granting defendants1 
motion for summary judgment based upon a finding: 
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THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW# the plaintiff discovered 
or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have discovered that he had sustained an injury and 
that the injury was caused by negligent action more 
than two years before he commenced an action against 
the health care providers; 
(R 187, Order) 
Appellant filed an Affidavit (R 171) and testified in his 
deposition (R 199) that he did not or could not have discovered 
defendants1 negligence until mid 1985. Therefore, there are 
clearly questions of fact that preclude the above finding entered 
by the court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER ONLY IF PLEADINGS, 
DEPOSITIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND ADMISSIONS SHOW THAT THERE 
IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AND THAT THE 
MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of 
fact, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing 
party. Thus the Court must evaluate all evidence, and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence, in a light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment [Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c)] Frisbee vs. K & K. Construction Co,, 
676 P.2d 387, (Utah, 1984). 
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On a motion for summary judgment, the judge is 
neither required nor permitted to find facts which are 
in issue but can only find that there are no genuine 
issues of fact to be found and that one party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carr vs> 
Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 464 P2d 580, 23 Utah 2d 415, 
(Utah, 1970). 
Based upon the ruling in Carr v. Bradshaw, Judge Moffat 
erred in making the finding which supported his Summary Judgment 
because the court failed to consider the deposition and affidavit 
of appellant stating that discovery of the defendants' negligence 
did not occur until mid 1985. 
The issues of fact raised by appellant and not considered by 
the court are: 
1) When did the appellant discover that he had 
sustained an injury through the negligence of a health care 
provider? 
2) Did appellant in fact Commence an action within 
two years of making that discovery? and 
3) Was the action commenced within a time that did not 
exceed four years after the alleged negligent act? 
This appeal clearly shows that there is ample evidence of 
fact which would prevent entry of a summary judgment in favor of 
defendants. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS SECTION 78-14-4. 
Appellant's claims are not barred by the Statute of 
Limitations Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, because appellant filed his claim within two years after 
the appellant or patient discovered, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, that he had been 
negligently injured. Appellant stated in his deposition that in 
April, 1982, he and his wife and Dr. Lindem discussed appellant's 
surgery as follows: 
Q. And Dr. Lindem at that time told you that he 
had done additional surgery? 
A. Yes, sir. She (appellant's wife) directly 
asked him what all they had done, and he 
said, We repaired the hernia, we removed a 
portion of his stomach that was covered with 
ulcer scars, tissue, we cut the nerves in his 
stomach and opened up the bottom of his 
stomach so he can process his food faster. 
And he said, with this type of surgery, 
it's just going to take time for him to get 
over it. And my wife said, Well, how much 
time? It's already been several months. And 
he said, Sometimes it takes as long as two or 
three years before you -- your system gets 
back to normal. 
(R 199: Floyd Deposition, pp. 96-97, lines 15-25 and 1.) 
Q. And your understanding was from Dr. Lindem 
that it might take two or three years for 
those symptoms to improve? 
A. That is correct. 
(R 199: Floyd Deposition, p. 98, lines 3-5) 
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Appellant Charles Floyd again reiterated that Dr. Lindem 
told him that it would take time to get over the problems from 
which he was suffering: 
Q. Was it your understanding, then, in September 
of 1982, that if diet and medications didn't 
help the dumping syndrome, surgery was going 
to be necessary or you can live with the 
problem? 
A. Well, he said that surgery was the last 
resort. He said that what he recommended was 
trying to take care of it with medication and 
through diet. 
Q. How did you feel when you learned from Dr. 
Lindem that he had done more surgery than 
you'd asked him to do and authorized him to 
do? 
A, Well, at that particular time, you know, I 
didn't really realize that he'd done 
something that I hadn't authorized. I 
thought that was part of the procedure to 
correct the hernia. I guess I have to admit 
it, I'm a dummy, I didn't know. 
Q« I take it you did not know that dumping 
syndrome was a complication of the surgery 
that you thought Dr. Lindem was going to 
perform? 
A. That's right. 
(Record 199: Floyd Deposition, p. 102, lines 1-19) 
In Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P2d 144 (Utah, 1979), at page 148, 
the court held that the term "discovery of injury" in the Statute 
of Limitations Section of the Health Care Malpractice Act means 
the discovery of an injury and knowledge of the negligence which 
caused the injury. The instant case is similar to Foil v. 
Ballinger in that the appellant did not know of his right of 
action for malpractice until he discovered that the unauthorized 
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surgery was not a necessary part of the hiatal hernia repair that 
he had undergone in December, 1981. 
In Foil v. Ballinger the claimant, although she knew she had 
a permanent subarachnoid phenol block, did not know that the 
rectal and bladder problems she had were caused primarily by the 
causative agents of the block administered in January, 1974. The 
medical report of a Workers Compensation medical panel provided 
her with the first opportunity to discover the cause of her 
continuing disabilities; and, thereafter, the claimant was found 
to have filed an appropriate claim and legal proceedings within 
the two year statutory period. The Utah Supreme Court, at page 
147, held that: 
In the health care field it is 
typically the case that there often is a great 
disparity in the knowledge of those who provide 
health care services and those who receive the 
services with respect to expected and unexpected 
side effects of a given procedure, as well as the 
nature, degree, and extent of expected after 
effects. While the recipient may be aware of a 
disability or dysfunction, there may be, to the 
untutored understanding of the average layman, no 
apparent connection between the treatment provided 
by a physician and the injury suffered. Even if 
there is, it may be passed off as an unavoidable 
side effect or a side effect that will pass with 
time. Indeed, common experience teaches that one 
often suffers pain and other physical difficulties 
without knowing or suspecting the true cause, and 
may, as often happens, ascribe a totally erroneous 
cause to the manifestations. . . But when the 
injuries are suffered that have been caused by an 
unknown act of negligence by an expert, the law 
ought not to be construed to destroy a right of 
action before a person even becomes aware of the 
existence of that right. 
15 
Furthermore, to adopt a construction of §78-
14-4 that encourages a person who experiences an 
injury, dysfunction, or ailment, and has no 
knowledge of its cause, to file a lawsuit against 
a health care provider to prevent a statute of 
limitations from running is not consistent with 
the unarguable sound proposition that unfounded 
claims should be strongly discouraged. One of the 
chief purposes of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act was to prevent the filing of unjustified 
lawsuits against health care providers, with all 
the attendant costs, economic and otherwise, that 
such suits entail. 
It would also be imprudent to adopt a rule 
that might tempt some health care providers to 
fail to advise patients of mistakes that have been 
made and even to make efforts to suppress 
knowledge of such mistakes in hope that the 
running of the statute of limitations would make a 
valid cause of action nonactionable. 
. . . That is, they favor the view that the 
two-year provision does not commence to run until 
the injured person knew or should have known that 
he had sustained an injury and that the injury was 
caused by negligent action. Foil v. Ballinger, 
601 P2d 144, pp. 147-148 (Utah, 1979). (Emphasis 
added) 
In this case there is certainly a question of fact as to 
whether the appellant reasonably believed the doctor when he was 
told that it may take two to three years before his system would 
get back to normal. 
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POINT III 
THE CASE OF FOIL V, BALLINGER IS STILL THE LAW IN UTAH. 
CASES CITED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL IN MEMORANDA SUBMITTED 
TO THE COURT IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE FACTS IN 
THE APPELLANT'S CASE. 
In Magoc v. Hooker, 796 F2d 377 (Utah, 1986), one of the 
cases relied upon by defendants, the claimant hired an attorney 
about two months after an alleged injury. Thereafter, the 
attorney wrote a letter to the defendant doctor on April 29, 
1981, stating that the claimant and his attorney believed the 
injury was caused by negligence in Utah. Said attorney then 
failed to commence action until September 12, 1983 (more than two 
years after the apparent discovery). 
The other case upon which defendants relied, Hargett v. 
Limberg, 598 F.Supp 152 (Utah, 1984), is a case wherein the 
parent and guardian ad litem indicated she was aware of the 
negligence of the defendant doctor on February 18, 1979 and gave 
testimony that at that time she told another doctor at Utah 
Valley Hospital that she believed Dr. Limberg had been negligent. 
The parent and guardian then failed to file a claim until 
February 16, 1983 -- well beyond the two-year limitation period. 
Also, there were no affidavits or other evidence to explain or 
raise questions of fact as to whether the statute of limitations 
had run. 
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The cases relied upon by defendants are distinguishable from 
the matter herein considered because unlike the present case, in 
the cases relied upon by defendants, either the plaintiff or 
plaintiff's representative admitted that they knew of the 
negligence and then failed to file a claim within two years. In 
this case, plaintiff specifically denies that he discovered or 
should have discovered the negligence until he was so informed by 
another doctor and that he thereafter filed a claim within two 
years. 
In addition, both Magoc v. Hooker and Hargett v. Limberg are 
federal cases rather than cases from the Utah Supreme Court and 
are not necessarily binding upon this Court. 
Basic principles of civil procedure provide that the party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment is entitled to the benefit 
of all favorable inferences. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P2d 1332 
(Utah, 1977). There clearly are questions of fact raised in 
plaintiff's deposition and plaintiff's affidavit, which show that 
plaintiff did not know or could not have known prior to mid 1985 
that there had been negligence by the health care providers in 
the treatment he had received. Affidavits in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment are to be liberally construed against 
summary judgment. Sutton v. Brown, 85 Idaho 104, 375 P2d 990 
(Idaho, 1962). 
There are still questions of fact to be decided by the Trier 
of Fact. Learned defense counsel, in their memoranda, cite facts 
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that may indicate to them with their medical/legal background, 
that the plaintiff, early in this matter, had the opportunity to 
become aware of unauthorized medical procedures which appear to 
said counsel to be malpractice. The plaintiff, however, is a 
layman, a person (with only a high school education) engaged in 
renting oil drilling equipment and its accouterments, and had 
been told that all procedures done were necessary and a part of 
the original hiatal hernia procedure. The plaintiff did not 
ascertain until a later date that the problems from which he 
suffered were related to the surgery which he subsequently 
learned was not an integral part of the hiatal hernia repair. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THERE WAS AN 
ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL THE FACTS FROM THE APPELLANT, 
WHETHER THERE WAS UNNECESSARY SURGERY AND UNAUTHORIZED 
SURGERY, AND WHETHER APPELLANT DID BRING THIS ACTION ON 
A TIMELY BASIS. 
In appellant's affidavit, appellant stated that he was told 
by defendant Dr. Martin C. Lindem that it would take two to three 
years for appellant's condition to remedy itself. (R 171 -- See 
paragraph 4 of appellant's Affidavit.) The appellant did not 
learn until mid 1985 that pyloroplasty and vagotomy were 
unnecessary and he did file his Notice of Intent to Commence 
19 
Legal Action within one year of that discovery, (R 173 — See 
paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of affidavit of appellant.) 
There is clearly a question of fact presented by appellant's 
affidavit and deposition. Succinctly stated, the question is as 
i 
follows: Did the health care providers attempt to conceal facts 
from the appellant and prevent him from discovering the injury he 
sustained and negligence involving the subject injury? 
A review of the affidavit and statements cited in 
appellantfs deposition and appellant's complaint indicate that 
there exists a question of fact as to the concealment alleged by 
the defendant Martin C. Lindem's actions. (See R 171-175, R 199 
Charles Floyd deposition pp. 96-97, R 2-20) 
Appellant has set forth his position on the questions of 
fact that clearly indicate that appellant's action has been 
timely brought. There are no counter affidavits or depositions 
to the contrary. 
POINT V 
THE SPECIAL STATUTE OF LIMITATION AS SET FORTH IN THE 
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT VIOLATES APPELLANT'S 
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER STATE LAW AND ALSO 
DENIES APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO FREE AND UNFETTERED ACCESS 
TO THE COURTS AS GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The Utah case of Foil v. Ballinger, cited infra, mentioned 
the great disparity between untutored laymen and the highly 
20 
trained physician. Ballinger further reiterates the proposition 
that the law ought not to be construed to destroy a right of 
action before a person can become aware of the existence of that 
right. 
There are cases indicating a trend that special statutes of 
limitation for Health Care Providers violate the rights of equal 
protection and access to the courts. An Arizona case entitled 
Kenyon v. Hammerf 688 P2d 961 (Ariz. 1984), cited and recognized 
in Utah Case of Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, 717 P2d 670 
(Utah 1985) at page 675, appears to be directly in point. 
In Kenyon v. Hammer, a nurse had erroneously recorded a 
blood type during the course of a woman's pregnancy as Rh 
positive when in fact it was Rh negative. If the doctor had been 
properly advised of the fact that the woman's blood was Rh 
negative, he would have administered RhoGAM, a drug which 
suppresses the immune response Rh negative mothers may develop. 
To be effective, the drug had to be administered within 72 hours 
after delivery of the first child. The drug was not administered 
and some five year later Mrs. Kenyon delivered a stillborn child 
and subsequently underwent tubal ligation to prevent further 
tragedies to protect her own health. The Arizona trial court 
found that the action by the nurse was merely a clerical error 
and consequently did not involve professional judgment, special 
skills or training and therefore was not entitled to special 
treatment under the Arizona Health Care Statute. 
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The Arizona Health Care statute was found to discriminate 
against a certain class of tort claimants who could not 
reasonably discover the fact that they had been injured until 
subsequently when a person, such as Mrs. Kenyon, became pregnant 
some five years later and suffered the consequences of the 
negligent act. I 
The Arizona Court, in discussing the constitutionality of 
their Health Care Act, found the appropriate test to be applied 
was the Strict Scrutiny test which holds that a statute may only 
be upheld if there is a compelling state interest to be served 
and the regulation is necessary to achieve the legislative 
objective. | 
The Arizona court held that the right to recover for bodily 
injuries is a fundamental right in Arizona as guaranteed by the 
Arizona Constitution. At page 976, the court stated that there 
was no compelling state interest "in providing economic relief to 
one segment of society by depriving those who have been wronged 
of access to, and remedy by, the judicial system." 
Further, the court stated: 
any profession . . . experiencing 
difficulty could be made the beneficiary of special 
legislation to ameliorate its economic adversity by 
limiting access to the courts by those who have been 
damaged. Under such a system our constitutional 
guarantees would be gradually eroded until this state 
became no more than a playground for the privileged and 
influential. 
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That part of the Arizona Health Care Statute dealing with an 
absolute bar three years from the date of injury was held 
unconstitutional. 
The court finally held: 
It is one thing, however to regulate by 
classification in setting up reasonable periods 
within which to bring an action, and it is another 
thing to confer special privilege upon one class 
of defendants by effectively abolishing the 
opportunity for those with even the most 
meritorious claims to assert them. 
The case at bar is similar to the Arizona case cited above. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act accords health care 
providers a shortened statute of limitations for situations where 
a claimant alleges that a health care provider has affirmatively 
acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-4(1)(b) states: 
In an action where it is alleged that a 
patient has been prevented from discovering 
misconduct on the part of a health care 
provider because that health care provider 
has affirmatively acted to fraudulently 
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim 
shall be barred unless commenced within one 
year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence, should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first 
occurs. 
In Utah there is a general statute of limitation dealing 
with actions based upon fraud which is Section 78-12-26(3) which 
states: 
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Within three years: (3) An action for 
relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; but 
the cause of action in such case shall not be 
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by 
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting 
the fraud or mistake. 
Under Utah law, actions have been allowed for numerous years 
after the event so long as the time plaintiff brings the action 
is within three years after the discovery of the mistake. Madsen 
v. Madsen# 269 P2d 132 (Utah, 1929). 
Actions based upon fraudulent concealment by the medical 
profession should not be protected; they basically involve 
dishonesty, fraud, malice, etc. Fraudulent concealment certainly 
does not foster or improve professional judgment, special skills, 
or training that is to be encouraged and to be entitled to 
special treatment under the Utah Health Care Statute. 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11 states: 
All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State, by himself or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a p^rty. 
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp, at page 675, the Utah court 
said: 
A plain reading of section 11 also establishes 
that the framers of the Constitution intended that an 
individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of 
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effective remedies designed to protect basic individual 
rights. A constitutional guarantee of access to the 
courthouse was not intended by the founders to be an 
empty gesture; individuals are also entitled to remedy 
by "due course of law11 for injuries to "person , 
property, or reputation. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in referring to 
the history of that state's similarly worded open 
courts provision stated that it was intended to secure 
adequate remedies for violated rights. The court 
stated: 
The concept of allowing a reasonable 
period of time for suit to be brought after 
the cause of action arises is not new in our 
law, for along with "substantive rights, the 
first settlers brought over the individual 
rights of adequate remedy and convenient 
procedure." State v. Saunders/ 66 N.H. 39, 
74, 25 A. 588, 589 (1889). Thus the "right 
to an adequate remedy [exists] for the 
infringement of a right derived from the 
unwritten law." 1(3, 25 A. at 589. When it 
came to establish a post-revolution form of 
government, the first part of our 
Constitution [which included an open courts 
provision] was devoted to chronicling our 
inherent rights. 
The provision "remedy by due course of law" would appear to 
demand that no special treatment be given to Health Care 
providers who act to fraudulently conceal their misconduct. 
In this matter, Dr. Lindemfs comment "It will take two to 
three years for the Claimant's condition to remedy itself" was 
certainly designed to give claimant continued hope that he would 
improve and could certainly have dissuaded appellant from seeking 
other opinions and information about the true nature of his 
condition. It also gave the health care provider a means of 
escaping liability for his negligence in luring the potential 
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claimant into a false sense of security. Then, after waiting for 
two to three years to pass, the health care provider is insulated 
from suit because the claimant did not discover his plight 
sooner. The health care provider then argues, through his 
counsel, that claimant should have discovered the concealment 
because it was readily apparent and he is now precluded from 
bringing action because he did not discover, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence should have discovered, and he did not 
bring his action within one year. | 
In this case at hand, by applying the shortened health care 
statute, our courts seem to be rewarding the tort feasor by 
giving him protection by a shortened statute of limitations and 
encouraging him to conceal from the claimant the true nature of 
his problems which were created by the misconduct of the tort 
feasor. I 
The notion of justice and fair play in our society and 
Section 11 of Article I of Utah State Constitution, stating all 
courts shall be open and every person shall have remedy by due 
course of law, demand that no group or entity shall be given 
special privilege to affirmatively act to fraudulently conceal 
their actions. 
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., cited infra, The Utah 
Court said at page 672: 
To be constitutional, a statute of limitations 
must allow a reasonable time for the filing of an 
action after a cause of action arises. Horn v. 
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Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 P. 555 (1915); Saylor v. Hall, 
Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218 (1973). In Wilson v. Iseminger, 
185 U.S. 55, 62, 22 S.Ct. 573, 575, 46 L.Ed. 804 
(1902), the United States Supreme Court stated: 
It may be properly conceded that all statutes 
of limitation must proceed on the idea that 
the party has full opportunity afforded him 
to try his right in the courts. A statute 
could not bar the existing rights of 
claimants without affording this opportunity; 
if it should do so, it would not be a statute 
of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to 
extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might 
be the purport of its provisions. 
It is for a finder of fact to decide when Mr. Floyd 
discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence 
ascertained, that he had been injured through the health care 
providers' negligence. This finding must be based upon the way 
the facts were presented to him and also in light of the conduct 
of the health care provider in his actions in his comments and in 
his statements to the claimant as to when the ultimate condition 
or final result of the claimant had been reached. Such 
statements of continued assurance to the claimant that he was 
going to be all right or he was going to continue to improve must 
be considered seriously by the finder of fact in arriving at such 
determination. A person who experiences an injury, dysfunction 
or ailment has no knowledge of its cause. It is not until he 
comes by way of knowledge of the cause that he has made the 
discovery. 
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The Claimant was still seeing Dr. Lindem in 1983 when 
assurances were made of his prospective recovery. 
It was not until 1984, when claimant was told his dumping 
syndrome was permanent and irreversible, that he really came by 
way of knowledge that his injury was permanent and irreversible 
and that what Dr. Lindem told him was not true — that his 
condition was not going to improve and he was not going to be all 
right. 
The test is to ascertain when Floyd discovered, or should 
have reasonably discovered, — not when learned defense counsel 
think they would have known or should have known. 
In this day, a claimant who follows the health care 
provider's admonitions and statements religiously should not 
thereafter be penalized by the mischief played upon the claimant 
by the unscrupulous health care provider. In the matter 
presently pending before this court, a mdre logical finding with 
the evidence before the court at this point in the proceedings 
would be that the claimant was delayed in discovering the 
negligence of the surgeon by the surgeon's own mischief in 
advising the potential claimant that he would be all right in two 
to three years. If this type of mischief is allowed to continue 
then we have encouraged health care providers to exercise 
fraudulent concealment and we lend encouragement to them by 
allowing a shortened statute of limitations. 
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If a health care provider engages in affirmative action to 
fraudulently conceal misconduct from a patient the interest of 
the state and community are not served, but are in reality 
circumvented. Justice, fair play and having a remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay, demand that we not accord special treatment to 
a wrongdoer, but that we treat all our citizenry fairly and 
equally. See generally Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Com., 657 P2d 1293, 1296 (Utah, 1982) and Industrial 
Comm. v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 409, 174 P2d 825, 829 (Utah, 1918). 
Therefore, it is clear that our appellate court should 
strike down a statute that gives special privilege to a 
wrongdoer. The court should foster statutes that are reasonable 
and fair to the entire community. The basic premise of the 
Constitution of the United States of America is bottomed upon 
notions of equality, fair play and equal treatment under the law. 
There is no cause to give health care providers special treatment 
or consideration when they affirmatively act to conceal their own 
misconduct. 
The special statute of limitations contained in Section 78-
14-4(1)(b) is clearly unconstitutional and must be accordingly 
struck down. Section 11 and the Due Process Clause of Article I 
Section 7 are related both in historical origins and to some 
extent in their constitutional functions. Both act to restrict 
the powers of both the courts and the Legislature. See Masich v. 
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U.S. Smelting, Refining & Mining Co, , 113 Utah 101, 191 P2d 612, 
623-24 (Utah, 1948). 
Finally, as set forth on page 676, Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp,, cited infra, the court said concerning Article I, Section 
11 of the Utah Constitution: 
. . . the basic purpose of Article I, section 11 
is to impose some limitation on that power for the 
benefit of those persons who are injured in their 
persons, property, or reputations since they are 
generally isolated in society, belong to no 
identifiable group, and rarely are able to rally the 
political process to their aid. Cf. Rosin v. 
Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 89 App.Div. 245, 86 N.Y.S. 49 
(1903). 
In Utah there are three cases dealing with failure of the 
claimant to give notice under the Health Care Malpractice Act. 
These cases by way of dictum indicate that the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice statute is not unconstitutional. See McGuire v. 
Univ. of Utah Med. Center, 603 P2d 786 (Utah, 1979), Yates v. 
Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P2d 252 (Utah, 1980) and Allen 
v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P2d 30 (Utah, 1981). Factually 
these cases do not deal with a situatiori like the instant case 
where the claimant is precluded from making discovery of the 
negligence along with the injury stemming from the subject 
negligence. A more enlightened analysis of the cases along with 
the case of Berry v. Beech Aircraft, cited infra, and its 
statements on Article I Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution 
clearly show that the special treatmer^ t afforded health care 
providers is unconstitutional under Utah law. 
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POINT VI 
CLEARLY THERE IS A CONFLICT OF LAW IN SECTION 
78-14-4(1)(b) AND 78-12-26(3) OF THE UTAH CODE. 
Utah Code §78-12-26(3) states: 
Within three years: (3) An action for relief on 
the ground of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action 
in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until 
the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-4(1)(b) states: 
In an action where it is alleged that a patient 
has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the 
part of a health care provider because that health 
care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently 
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be 
barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence/ should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs. 
Under §78-12-26(3) we have a statute and body of law dealing 
with matters involving actions on ground of fraud and discovery 
by the aggrieved party. The legislature saw fit to give a three-
year statute after discover on the general statute but gave 
special statute to health care providers in §78-14-4(1)(b). A 
similar situation occurred in Section 78-14-4(2) and 78-12-26 
involving limiting minor's claims to the provisions of the 
special statute. In 1979 the provisions of §78-14-4(2) were 
amended to include the language "notwithstanding the provisions 
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of §78-12-26." It would clearly appear that a similar amendment 
is needed to clear up the conflict that exists between §78-14-
4(1)(b) and §78-12-26(3). 
The Legislature is not deemed to do unnecessary acts. But 
in allowing the legislature to do patch work upon its 
questionable Health Care Malpractice Act one must be mindful of 
those problems pointed out in Point VII that concludes this 
brief. 
POINT VII 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VICTIMS GENERALLY HAVE NO CONTROL 
OVER THE INCEPTION OF THEIR AFFLICTIONS OR ILLNESS AND 
EVEN LESS CHOICE CONCERNING THE MEDICAL MIS-, MAL- OR 
NON-FEASANCE PRACTICED UPON THEM AND ARE ENTITLED TO AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE PURPOSES OF LEGISLATION AS WELL AS A 
BALANCING OF THE INTEREST SERVED AND THE INTEREST 
BURDENED. 
To begin this final point, the court should be aware of the 
great financial disparity between the victim, Charles Floyd, and 
the medical doctors, their wealth, 4n(^ well funded medical 
association that champions their cause. Mr. Floyd is here before 
this court because his attorney has personally financed his cause 
to give him his day in court. The plaintiff's attorney has 
become the victim's voice. This is recognized in Learner, 
Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A 
Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" analysis to Safeguard Individual 
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Liberties, 18 Harv.J. on Legis. 143, hereinafter cited as Learner 
"Quid Pro Quo", at age 186 states: 
Malpractice victims may very well lack the 
physical faculties, and financial resources to mount a 
successful challenge to laws curtailing their rights. 
The Kansas court in the case of Coburn, by and through 
Coburn v. Agustin cited as 627 F.Supp 983 (D.Kan 1985) recognized 
that disparity and concluded that the rights at issue were 
sensitive and sufficiently important and further recognized that: 
It seems highly unlikely that many individuals 
actively contemplate the relatively remote risk that 
they may become malpractice victims. The number of 
actual victims is not large enough to generate 
widespread public concern for personal safety, nor is 
notice of the restrictive legislation sufficiently 
prominent to draw the attention of individuals who may 
rationally assume that they continue to possess an 
effective judicial remedy. There is no apparent 
impetus to trigger the intense concerns that galvanize 
individuals to coalesce into political organizations 
that participate actively in the legislative process. 
At this writing, at age 46 years, appellant is only able to 
work at a job that gives him about one-third of the income he 
previously enjoyed due to the serious conditions from which he 
suffers -- dumping syndrome and diarrhea. As a result of the 
unauthorized negligent surgery, appellant's stomach empties in 
about 10 minutes what it take a normal stomach to empty in 77 
minutes. (R 199, Charles Floyd Deposition, pages 100-107) This 
dumping results in constant diarrhea. 
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Perhaps, in the tests espoused in the final analysis, we 
should ask: Where do you compensate the victim and rehabilitate 
him? Through the tort system of free enterprise in the 
capitalistic system or through the welfare system of a socialized 
system? Perhaps, this is where the ultimate balancing occurs. 
There are few bastions of the free enterprise system still 
remaining which have not become eroded into a part of a welfare 
state as a result of special legislation.) As stated in Coburn v. 
Agustin, cited infra, the Kansas Court concludes: 
A fair reading of a long history of procedures 
suggests that the constitutional balance should favor 
the victims. 
Commenting upon an argument espoused by the defense in 
Coburn v. Agustin that reduction of awards against health care 
providers will assure the availability of low cost insurance for 
the providers, the court states at page 995: 
While the Court is willing to follow the somewhat 
torturous tautology of asserted purpose, the Court must 
examine the factual nexus between the goal of quality 
health care and the means of allowing the tort-feasor 
to have the benefit of insurance privately purchased by 
or for the tort victim. Numerous courts and 
commentators have sagely observed that the extending of 
special litigation benefits to the medical profession 
will do little to protect the public health. "On the 
contrary, the quality of health care may actually 
decline. To the extent that in tort actions of the 
malpractice type if the medical profession is less 
accountable than formerly, relaxation of medical 
standards may occur with the public the victim." 
Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832, 838 (Ohio Ct. 
Comm. Pleas 1976). See also Comment, California1s 
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal 
Protection Challenge, 52 S.Cal.L. Rev. 829, 854 n. 143 
(1979). 
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In conclusion, the court continued and commented upon the 
Medical Malpractice crisis and stated as follows: 
Regarding need, defendants cavalierly refer to the 
"obvious" medical malpractice crisis justifying this 
legislation. What is apparently so clear to the 
medical profession, the insurance industry, their 
respective lobbyists, and the Legislature is a matter 
of deep and growing concern to this Court as well as a 
number of commentators and other courts across the 
country. In the Legislature's haste to remedy the 
situation, it has overlooked, or more likely, ignored 
the fundamental cause of the so-called crisis: it is 
the unmistakable result not of excessive verdicts, but 
of excessive malpractice by health care providers. 
. . . In this case, a privilege is being created 
on behalf of doctors and insurance companies, while the 
class that pays the price is comprised of injured and 
powerless medical malpractice victims. The restriction 
of important rights of a disadvantaged class 
significantly outweighs the benefits sought to be 
conferred upon the privileged class. 
Section 78-14-2 of the Health Care Malpractice Act sets out 
legislative findings and declarations. It is interesting to 
review the legislative hearings concerning the passage of this 
Act in 1976. Representative Norman Bangerter said the act was 
needed to guarantee the continued writing of malpractice 
liability insurance and reduce insurance premiums because of the 
increase in number of suits and judgments arising from 
malpractice claims. Representative Frank Matheson made a motion 
which was supported by factual information and showed that in 
1976, and in the immediate years prior thereto, there was no 
increase in malpractice law suits or excessive judgments in Utah; 
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but there was actually a decline in the number of cases filed in 
Utah's district courts. Representative M^theson further pointed 
out that Utah was being penalized by what was happening in other 
states. Representative Matheson's amendment, which never passed, 
was intended to delete most of Section 78-14-2 because it just 
was not true in Utah. (See Record of Proceedings in Legislative 
Proceedings on Third Reading and Passage of Act, January 30, 1976 
available at the House of Representative's office) 
CONCLUSION 
It clearly appears that the court made a finding and ruled 
upon the basis of that finding. The court, however, was neither 
required nor permitted to find facts; but could only find that 
there were no genuine issues of fact. 
Excerpts from appellant's complaint, appellant's affidavit, 
and appellant's deposition, clearly establish there are factual 
questions surrounding plaintiff's claim. There are no counter 
affidavits or depositions that dispute appellant's claim that he 
did not discover the negligence of tjie health care providers 
until mid 1985. 
The case of Foil v. Ballinger is clearly still law in Utah. 
Therefore, the court must take into account the great disparity 
of knowledge between a skilled health care provider and his 
layman patient. The patient may be awate of a dysfunction; but 
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may make no apparent connection between the treatment received 
and the injury suffered. The law should not be construed to 
destroy a right of action before a claimant becomes aware of the 
existence of that right. The facts in the cases cited by 
respondents, in support of their motions for summary judgment, 
are clearly distinguishable from the facts which the court has 
been asked to review in this matter. 
There are questions of fact as to whether the appellant had 
certain information concealed from him by the health care 
providers' actions and statements that it would take two to three 
years for the appellant"s system to remedy itself. 
Therefore, the Court should reverse the ruling of the 
District Court, indicating that summary judgment was improper and 
remand the case for trial on all issues. 
Finally, the special shortened statute of limitation of the 
Health Care Malpractice Act is in conflict with the general 
statute of limitations and should be declared unconstitutional as 
it is a restriction of important rights of a disadvantaged class 
while the same statute rewards and gives a privilege to a special 
class of persons, the health care providers, which is not 
available to the public at large. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £> day of January, 1988. 
FAiEftOURN & PESMILL 
TJf. CL^^^FAIRBOURN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
CHARLES FLOYD, 
VS. 
Plaintiff, 
WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, 
INC., MARTIN C. LINDEM, JR., 
M.D., LYNN L. WILCOX, M.D., 
and ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civilf No. 86-2223 
Judge Richard Moffat 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) ss. 
CHARLES FLOYD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. He is the plaintiff in the above entitled action. 
2. In April, 1982, plaintiff and his wife were informed by 
Dr. Martin C. Lindem that at the time of the surgery to repair a 
hiatal hernia in December of 1981, scar tissue was removed, the 
bottom of plaintiff's stomach was opened up so he could process 
his food faster, and the nerves to plaintiff's stomach were cut, 
and that all of the procedures referred to above were necessary 
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to properly repair the hiatal hernia and condition from which he 
suffered. 
3. Plaintiff is merely a high school graduate and has 
never studied the stomach nor the digestive system. Plaintiff 
relied upon his doctors' representations concerning his stomach 
problems. The doctors never fully explained to plaintiff the 
procedures or the full problem that he had or that some of the 
surgeries performed were not connected to or necessary for repair 
of the hiatal hernia. 
4. In the subject conversation, Dr. Lindem stated: 
a. The conditions from which plaintiff was suffering 
were the natural or expected consequences of the subject 
procedures; and 
b. It would take plaintiff two to three years for 
plaintiff's condition to remedy itself so that plaintiff would no 
longer suffer from severe depression, upset stomach, and 
diarrhea. 
5. That plaintiff was led to believe that the problems 
from which he suffered were unavoidable side effects from the 
surgery he had received for the hiatal hernia. 
6. Dr. Lindem told plaintiff the above problems would 
resolve themselves if he followed Dr. Lindem's instructions and 
Dr. Lindem then prescribed medication and dietary means of 
controlling the conditions from which plaintiff was suffering. 
2 
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7. Dr. Lynn Wilcox later also advised plaintiff that 
plaintiff could control his problems with diet and medication. 
8. It was not until September of 1984, that plaintiff was 
advised that surgery might be necessary to lessen the problem of 
diarrhea, which was caused by what is known as "dumping 
syndrome," and that said diarrhea and dumping syndrome now 
appeared to be of a permanent nature and would not change unless 
further surgery was performed to slow down food from exiting 
plaintiff's stomach at such a rapid rate. 
9. Until September of 1984, the plaintiff reasonably 
believed that the conditions from which he suffered, depression, 
upset stomach, and severe diarrhea, would be corrected by time 
and the medications and diet control procedures that were 
recommended by the treating defendant doctors. 
10. It was not until mid 1985, several months after his 
hospitalization in September of 1984, that plaintiff discovered 
that the upset stomach, dizziness, diarrhea and dumping syndrome 
were results from the pyloroplasty (opening up of lower part of 
stomach), and vagotomy (severing of vagus nerves), and that his 
condition was not going to improve and that the performing of the 
pyloroplasty and vagotomy were not part of the procedure to 
correct his hiatal hernia, curb Barretts Disease and the reflux 
esophagitis from which he initially suffered. 
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11. The plaintiff, upon learning from another surgeon that 
the conditions from which he suffered were a result of 
unnecessary surgery not related to the repair of plaintiff's 
hiatal hernia, contacted an attorney to ascertain and verify 
whether doctors Lindem and Wilcox had been negligent and if the 
negligent treatment caused the conditions from which plaintiff 
was suffering. 
12. Later, in November of 1985f plaintiff's attorney caused 
plaintiff's medical records to be reviewed by Dr. Edward Woodward 
in Gainesville, Florida and was informed that in fact there 
appeared to be negligence by his treating physicians and also 
there appeared to be a lack of obtaining informed consent from 
plaintiff, by Dr. Martin C. Lindem prior treating the plaintiff 
in the manner in which the plaintiff was treated. 
13. At this point, the four year statute had not run, so 
plaintiff instructed his counsel to file a notice of claim in 
late November of 1985. 
DATED this £ ^ day of June, 1987. 
, ^ l ^ f ^ 
CHARLES FLOYDT X 
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23 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^^ day of June, 
1987. 
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Affidavit this 23 day of June, 1987, to: 
Elliot J. Williams 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
J. Anthony Eyre 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gary D. Stott 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
^^ph^fJ 
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483) 
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Western Surgical Associates, Inc. 
and Martin C. Lindem, Jr., M.D. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES FLOYD, 
Plaintiff, ORDER 
v. 
Civil No. 86-2223 
WESTERN SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, 
INC., MARTIN C. LINDEM, JR., Judge Richard Moffat 
M.D., LYNN L. WILCOX, M.D., 
and ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
The defendants', Western Surgical Associates, Inc., 
Martin C. Lindem, Jr., M.D., Lynn L. Wilcox, M.D. and 
St. Mark's Hospital, Motion For Summary Judgment having come 
on for argument on June 26, 1987, before the Honorable 
Richard Moffat, plaintiff's counsel being represented by 
Clayton Fairbourn, and defendants being represented by Elliott 
Williams, Anthony Eyre, and Bruce Garner, the Court having 
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heard argument on the matter and being fully advised in the 
premises, now finds the following: 
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, the plaintiff discovered or 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered that he had sustained an injury and that the 
injury was caused by negligent action more than two years 
before he commenced an action against the health care provi-
ders; consequently, his claims of medical malpractice are 
barred by the statute of limitations prescribed in Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amen-
ded) . 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
the defendants1 Motion For Summary Judgment is granted, and that 
the above-entitled action is dismissed with prejudice pursuant 
to Rule 56, each party to bear their own costs. 
DATED this<3£- daY o f July* 1987. 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
tOep-t^C!erk' 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Lynn F r e a r , b e i n g d u l y sworn , s a y s t h a t s h e i s employed i n t h e 
law o f f i c e s of Snow, C h r i s t e n s e n & M a r t i n e a u , a t t o r n e y s f o r D e f e n d a n t s , 
Western Surgical A s s o c i a t e s , Inc. and Martin C. Lindem, J r . , 
M.D. 
herein; that she served the attached Order 
(Case No. 8 6 - 2 2 2 3 Sa l t Lake County) upon t h e p a r t i e s 
l i s t e d below by p l ac ing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed t o : 
D. Clayton Fairbourn 
Fairbourn & Peshe l l 
7321 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
J . Anthony Eyre 
Kipp and Chris t ian , P.C. 
City Center 1, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
S a l t Lake City , Utah 84111-2314 
Gary D. Stott 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P. O. Box 2465 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84110 
and causing the same to be mailed, f i r s t c l a s s , postage prepaid, on the 
f ^ d a y of J u l y 1987. 
Lyrfn Frear Ly: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Cp^A~' day of July 
1987. 
My commission expires: 
HW-9D 
;// PfrkuJV) 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
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